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Abstract: 
This paper provides the first empirical information about barriers related to the diffusion of 
nanotechnology, a general purpose technology. Our analysis is based on the findings from a 
state-wide survey of companies in North Carolina, USA. We find that the primary barrier is lack 
of access to early-stage capital, and the extent of this barrier is greater when the company 
contributes to the value chain for nanotechnology through R&D as opposed to through products 
or services. Another barrier is lack of access to university equipment and facilities, a problem 
greater in companies involved in nanotechnology research. From a policy perspective, our 
analysis suggests that state governments could act as venture capitalists to overcome market 
failure in the capital market, and that states could provide incentives to universities through 
public/private centers of excellence for sharing capital equipment and facilities with 
nanotechnology companies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act (PL 108-153; hereafter, the 
Act) was signed into law in December 2003 by US President George W. Bush. It authorized $3.7 
billion in federal nanotechnology-related R&D spending over four years, starting in fiscal year 
2005. Receiving broad bipartisan support in Congress, the Act put into law the programs and 
activities supported by the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), one of the President's 
highest multi-agency R&D priorities.1 The Act formally made nanotechnology the highest 
priority funded science and technology effort since the efforts of the United States to win the 
‘space race’ (Choi, 2003). 
Although there is not a uniformly agreed upon definition of nanotechnology, the widely accepted 
NNI definition states that: 
[Nanotechnology refers to] the understanding and control of matter at dimensions of 
roughly 1 to 100 nanometers, where unique phenomena enable novel applications.2 
The US government fostered the NNI, and hence the Act, in part because of the expected 
economic impact associated with nanoscale science and technology. While estimates of 
nanotechnology's economic impact vary widely across academic, government, and business 
experts – ranging from $1 trillion to $2 trillion in 20153 – most agree that its future potential is 
enormous.4 According to the National Research Council (2002, p. 2): 
With potential applications in virtually every existing industry and new applications yet 
to be discovered, nanoscale science and technology will no doubt emerge as one of the 
major drivers of economic growth in the first part of the new millennium. 
Widespread commercial adoption of nanotechnology is already growing rapidly, and early-
commercial applications of nanotechnology have focused on improving existing products in such 
varied markets as cosmetics, coatings, textiles, and displays. Examples of areas in which 
nanotechnology is expected to have a high commercial impact in the future include improved 
chemical and biological sensors (within 1–5 years), new targeted drug therapies (within 5–10 
years), and new molecular electronics (in 20+ years) (PCAST, 2005). The extent to which 
commercial potential in these areas is achieved, however, and the speed with which the United 
States achieves it, will depend in large part on the extent to which barriers to companies’ 
adoption and integration of nanotechnology can be identified and then lessened. 
Perhaps not surprising, given the recent origins of nanotechnology research, there is heretofore 
no systematic research on barriers inhibiting the diffusion of nanotechnology from the laboratory 
to commercial application. This void of information is troubling, especially from the perspective 
of economic growth. Nanotechnology, a general purpose technology as discussed below, is also a 
key element of technology infrastructure in that it is the foundation to the design, development, 
deployment, and use of other technologies and technology-based products and processes that are 
or could be central to the innovation process. This paper provides the first such information. 
Based on data collected from a survey of the population of North Carolina companies already 
using nanotechnology, the paper identifies existing barriers and the extent to which they are 
perceived by survey respondents as inhibiting the future growth and competitiveness of their 
companies. North Carolina is one of the states in the United States long recognized as being 
among the leaders in high-technology research, development and commercialization and, thus, 
seems a good leading indicator of early prerequisites to the rapid diffusion of nanotechnology 
research (Luger and Goldstein, 1991; Link, 1995, 2002; Link and Scott, 2003; Fesler et al., 
2005). 
Section 2 presents a brief historical overview of US efforts to advance nanotechnology.5 We 
discuss in Section 3 the population of nanotechnology companies in North Carolina and the 
methodology used to collect our survey information. Our statistical analysis is presented in 
Section 4. In Section 5, we provide preliminary policy recommendations for ways to address 
diffusion barriers and enhance the adoption of nanotechnology. 
2 US EFFORTS TO ADVANCE NANOTECHNOLOGY 
The NNI serves as the US government's primary mechanism for supporting nanoscience research 
and nanotechnology development. Since its inception, the NNI's focus has been to develop an 
understanding of the novel properties that occur at the nanoscale and to harness the ability to 
control matter at the atomic and molecular level (PCAST, 2005). 
2.1 Activities Setting the Stage for the Nanotechnology Act 
Two motivations gave rise to the NNI. First, as mentioned above, nanoscale science and 
technology are predicted to have an enormous impact on the quality of life throughout the world. 
Second, at the time the NNI began there were no established major industrial markets for 
nanotechnology products. Government leadership and funds were deemed necessary to promote 
technology transfer activities to private industry by accelerating the time required for developing 
the infrastructure and technologies industry needs to exploit nanotechnology innovations and 
discoveries. 
The NNI began long before the Act was passed. In early 1996, representatives from industry, 
government, and university laboratories convened to discuss the prospects for nanoscale science 
and technology. The attempt to coordinate at the federal-level scientific and technical work at the 
nanoscale began in November of that same year when staff members from six agencies decided 
to meet regularly to discuss their respective plans for programs in nanoscale science and 
technology. This group met informally until September 1998, when the National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC) designated the group the Interagency Working Group on 
Nanotechnology (IWGN) under the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 
(OSTP). 
The IWGN laid the groundwork for the NNI by sponsoring numerous workshops and studies to 
help to define the state of the art in nanoscale science and technology and to forecast potential 
future developments in the field. Moreover, the group published reports on the state of the 
science between July and September 1999, including: 
• Nanostructure Science and Technology: A Worldwide Study, a report based on the 
findings of an expert panel that visited nanoscale science and technology laboratories 
around the world. 
• Nanotechnology Research Directions, a workshop report with input from academic, 
private, and government participants. 
These two documents supported the IWGN efforts to raise nanoscale science and technology to 
the level of a national initiative by pointing up the current and potential future impacts of 
nanotechnology innovations and discoveries, respectively. According to Mihail Roco, Senior 
Advisor for Nanotechnology at the National Science Foundation (NSF) and primary author of 
the above reports, this was a crucial time for nanoscale science and technology (Bozeman and 
Boardman, 2004, p. 17): 
At that moment many looked at nanotechnology as science fiction. So we developed [the 
NNI] like a science project, from the bottom up. We started first of all to look at the 
fundamentals that would justify investment and not just to the smallness. We emphasized 
the new properties, the new phenomena where you have only a few mechanisms that 
could potentially revolutionize fields from medicine to electronics, as well as benefit 
society. It was a process to convince people. The NNI was not a decision at the political 
level. 
In August 1999, IWGN drafted its first plan for a national-scale initiative in nanoscale science 
and technology. Both the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) 
and OSTP were involved in approving the plan.6 In January 2000, the White House officially 
announced its endorsement of the NNI and included the initiative in its 2001 budget submission 
to Congress. 
To assist the Clinton administration convince Congress that the NNI should be a top priority, in 
February 2000 the IWGN prepared another report, National Nanotechnology Initiative: Leading 
to the Next Industrial Revolution, this time to supplement the President's budget request. The 
report highlighted the nanotechnology funding mechanisms developed for the initiative as well 
as the funding allocations by each participating federal agency. Moreover, it outlined 
nanotechnology goals and benchmarks, infrastructure requirements, and it contained examples of 
already-existing nanotechnology applications and partnerships that would become key 
components of the NNI. 
After the February report, IWGN disbanded and the NSTC's Committee on Technology 
established the Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and Technology subcommittee (NSET) to fill 
IWGN's shoes.7 This ‘new’ group, which was chaired by Roco and comprised of the same 
people who staffed IWGN, drafted the NNI implementation plan, National Nanotechnology 
Initiative: The Initiative and Its Implementation Plan. NSET submitted this plan to Congress in 
July 2000, which was identical to the February report save new sections on interagency 
management objectives and coordination. 
In November 2000, Congress appropriated $422 million for the NNI for fiscal year 2001, raising 
nanoscale science and technology to the level of a federal initiative. The subsequent activities 
paved the way to the formalized policies of the Nanotechnology Research and Development Act. 
2.2 Events Subsequent to the Passage of the Act 
Consistent with that focus, approximately 95% of the funding authorized by the Act was targeted 
to scientific R&D – roughly 60% for academia and 35% for government laboratories. Thus, by 
design, and consistent with similar national programs of this type, the NNI's primary purpose is 
to provide a strong R&D foundation from which industry can select technologies to exploit for 
commercial purposes. 
Even with this strong focus on R&D, advancing nanotechnology commercialization remains a 
critical component of the NNI. Two examples clearly illustrate this point. First, The 2004 
National Nanotechnology Initiative Strategic Plan (hereafter, the Strategic Plan), mandated by 
the Act, outlined the following four national goals: 
1.  Maintain a world-class research and development program aimed at realizing the full 
potential of nanotechnology. 
2.  Facilitate transfer of new technologies into products for economic growth, jobs, and 
other public benefit. 
3.  Develop educational resources, as skilled workforce, and the supporting infrastructure 
and tools to advance nanotechnology. 
4. Support responsible development of nanotechnology. 
Underlying the first three goals, particularly the second one, is a fundamental appreciation of 
nanotechnology's importance to the economy and the need to harness nanotechnology for 
commercial purposes. 
Second, the Act charged the NSTC with developing a plan to utilize federal programs, such as 
the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program and the Small Business Technology 
Transfer (STTR) program, to support commercialization of nanotechnology.8 Consistent with 
that charge, the Strategic Plan:9 
Encourage[s] agencies participating in the NNI to have components of their SBIR and 
STTR programs focused on nanotechnology topics, and in particular on 
nanomanufacturing…[and to]…Facilitate use of NNI-supported user facilities by small 
businesses that seek and receive SBIR and STTR grants and contracts. 
In addition to these two examples, the Strategic Plan documented a number of current activities 
and plans to support the transfer of nanotechnology discoveries from the laboratory to 
commercial use. Among these are establishing industry liaison groups; supporting meetings 
involving industry, government, and industry; establishing and supporting user facilities 
available to researchers from all sectors; funding multidisciplinary research teams that include 
industry and university researchers; encouraging the exchange of researchers between 
universities and industry; establishing centers focused on nanomanufacturing research; and 
engaging with regional, state, and local nanotechnology initiatives. 
Due to the brevity of the NNI's existence, efforts to assess how well it is meeting its goals have 
only recently begun (e.g. Bozeman and Boardman, 2004). In 2005, the PCAST undertook the 
first formal US federal government assessment of the NNI: The National Nanotechnology 
Initiative at Five Years: Assessment and Recommendations of the National Nanotechnology 
Advisory Panel (hereafter, the Assessment). The Assessment's executive summary stresses that 
(PCAST, 2005, p. 1): 
[The federal government's] substantial and sustained investment in nanotechnology has 
been largely based on the expectation that that advances in understanding and harnessing 
novel nanoscale properties will generate broad-ranging economic benefits for our Nation. 
With respect to the NNI's progress on issues related to nanotechnology's economic impact, the 
Assessment found that several industrial sectors have a high and growing level of interest and 
investment in nanotechnology and are likely to outpace levels of national investment in the near 
future. 
Nanotechnology is, or perhaps more correctly is expected to be, a general purpose technology 
(Youtie et al., forthcoming). A general purpose technology is an enabling technology, one that 
when adopted and used is expected to change production and consumption activity and behavior. 
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) argue that a general purpose technology has the following 
three characteristics: pervasiveness, an inherent potential for technological improvements, and 
innovational complexities that give rise to increasing returns to scale; thus, in a broad sense, 
general purpose technologies are part of technology infrastructure.10 And, over time, 
nanotechnology is expected to possess these characteristics.11 We argue that nanotechnology 
represents, in the form of a general purpose technology, a technology infrastructure, supporting 
the conduct of R&D and the application of innovations in production and in other technology-
based activities. According to Davey (2003, p. 2): 
All natural materials and systems establish their fundamental properties at the atomic and 
molecular scale. Consequently, the ability to control matter at the shoes [nano] levels 
provides the means for tailoring the fundamental properties, phenomena, and processes 
exactly at the scale where the basic properties are determined. 
In an effort to facilitate further nanotechnology transfer from the laboratory (company as well as 
federal) to the marketplace, the Assessment recommended two action steps beyond those 
outlined in the 2004 Strategic Plan (PCAST, 2005, p. 3): 
 
1. The NNI's outreach to, and coordination with, the States should be increased. 
2. The NNI should examine how to improve knowledge management of NNI assets. 
These recommendations stem from PCAST's position that, while the federal government can 
take steps to help promote technology transfer, the primary responsibility for funding product 
manufacturing should be left to the private sector with appropriate assistance from state and local 
governments. 
3 DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY AND SURVEY FINDINGS 
At the end of 2005, the population of nanotechnology-based or nanotechnology-related 
companies in North Carolina totaled 40.12 With the assistance of the North Carolina Board of 
Science and Technology,13 the president (or his/her counterpart) of each company within this 
population of nanotechnology companies was asked to complete a pre-tested survey instrument 
related to, among other things, barriers to the diffusion of nanotechnology.14 
Twenty-five of the 40 companies responded to the survey. This represents a 62.5% response. 
Figure 1 shows the location of each of the 40 companies in North Carolina in relationship to 
many of the state's universities with nanotechnology research centers. All but two of the 
companies in the population, one of which did not respond to the survey, are within 30 miles of 
at least one university-based nanotechnology research center.15 
 
Figure 1. Population of nanotechnology companies in North Carolina. 
Although not the focus of this paper, and thus not an issue in the empirics that follow, it is 
probably not coincidental that the vast majority of the nanotechnology companies shown in 
Figure 1 are juxtaposed to the state's research universities. Such location provides the 
opportunity for the acquisition of new knowledge – tacit knowledge in particular – and easier 
access to new innovations. The theory of agglomeration economics emphasizes such knowledge 
spillovers (Swann, 1998).16 
The four survey statements that are the focus of this paper are in Table I and the mean responses 
(n=25) to each question are in column (2) of Table II. Overall, there was, on average, 
‘agreement’ to each of the statements, but the greatest agreement was to the statement about 
access to early-stage capital. Access to early-stage capital being the greatest barrier is not 
surprising because nanoscience is not yet fully understood either in terms of its properties or 
capabilities for leveraging the commercialization potential of nanotechnology. As such, there are 
aspects of market failure in the capital market because of asymmetry of information regarding 
risk and return between a company and a financial institution.17 
Table I Survey questions related to barriers to the diffusion of nanotechnology.Regarding the 
following selected factors for promoting your company's nanotechnology-based growth and 
competitiveness, please respond to the following statements using the response codes −3= 
completely disagree, −2= mostly disagree, −1= somewhat disagree, 0= neutral, +1= somewhat 
agree, +2= mostly agree, and +3= completely agree:‘My company could grow faster and be more 
competitive if it: 
 1. … had significantly greater access to 
university faculty who were doing research 
related to nanotechnology.’ 
 2. … had significantly greater access to 
university nanotechnology-related facilities 
and equipment.’ 
 3. … had significantly greater access to 
early-stage capital.’ 
 4. … had access to a significantly more 
qualified – in terms of nanotechnology 




Table II Descriptive statistics on the variables. 
Variable Mean (n=25) Mean (n=19) Standard deviation (n=19) Range (n=19) 
Barrier to Growth 
 Access to faculty 0.88 1.06 1.59 −2 to +3 
 Access to equipment 1.20 1.22 1.52 −2 to +3 
 Access to early-stage capital 1.68 1.61 1.65 −2 to +3 
 Access to more qualified 
labor force 
1.16 1.39 1.29 −2 to +3 
RD Na 0.67 0.49 0/1 
Years Na 3.94 4.12 1–15 
NanoPct Na 58.03 44.56 0–100 
Emp (1000s) Na 0.18 0.38 0.005–1 
Rev ($M) Na 3.89 0.46 0.025–20 
 
From previous research (e.g. Feller and Roessner, 1995; Lee, 1996), we expected companies to 
perceive benefits from an association with a university – its faculty and especially its facilities 
(Santoro and Chakrabarti, 2001). Also, because nanoscience and nanotechnology are only in 
their infancy, qualified labor is an issue for at least some companies, especially small companies. 
In the following section, we posit an econometric model to explain inter-company differences in 
the importance of access to the resources listed in Table I. We view a stated company's need for 
greater access to a resource as evidence that there is an existing barrier inhibiting an efficient 
diffusion of nanotechnology. Thus, the policy question raised by our findings is how to assist 
companies acquire these needed resources assuming that the existence of the identified barriers 
represents a market failure. 
 
4 THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
To explain inter-company differences in the need for greater access to complementary resources 
to enhance the diffusion of nanotechnology and thereby facilitate greater nanotechnology-based 
growth and competitiveness, we posit the following model: 
 
where the variable (ResourceNeed i ) represents the ith resource barrier that is inhibiting a 
greater diffusion of nanotechnology, i=1, 2, 3, and 4 based on the −3 to +3 Likert scale response 
to each of the four statements in Table I. The greater the value of (ResourceNeed i ), the greater 
the relative importance of a company needing access to that ith resource. 
The four independent variables in Eq. (1) represent selected company characteristics. 
Emphasizing these variables follows from various niches of economic and innovation theory, but 
their inclusion in the model in Eq. (1) is also driven by the availability of company-specific 
information. Estimating Eq. (1) will allow a description of the type of company that is facing a 
particular resource barrier, and thus substantiate policy recommendations to lessen barriers to the 
diffusion of nanotechnology. 
RD is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the responding company's role in the value chain for 
nanotechnology is in research and development (as opposed to production of a product or 
service), and 0 otherwise.18 All else equal, R&D-based nanotechnology companies may have a 
differentiated need for resources than other companies farther down the supply chain, and thus 
may face skilled knowledge and specialized equipment barriers more so than general labor 
market barriers. To the extent that R&D-based nanotechnology companies have a greater 
absorptive capacity to utilize efficiently skilled knowledge and specialized equipment, they may 
have a greater demand for such internally lacking resources. The presence of skilled knowledge 
and specialized equipment barriers could imply a related need for early-stage capital. Thus, we 
hypothesize that the estimated coefficient on RD in the university faculty, the university 
equipment, and early-state capital equations to be positive. 
Years is the number of years the company has been incorporating nanotechnology materials 
and/or methods into its activities, and thus it measures accumulated experience of the company 
with the technology and its underlying science base. Holding constant the stage of the company 
in the supply chain, experience could dampen the company's need for greater access to early-
stage capital, but it could also enhance the company's need for each of the other complementary 
resources. Thus, we hypothesize that the estimated coefficient on Years to be negative in the 
early-stage capital equation but positive in the other three equations. 
Finally, companies differ in the extent to which they are involved with nanotechnology. NanoPct 
is the percent of each company's R&D activities that incorporate or involve the use of 
nanotechnology-based materials and/or methods. Antonelli (2006, p. 211) noted: 
Localized technological change consists of creative adoption where external knowledge 
and embodied technologies are implemented with internal competence [emphasis added] 
and idiosyncratic knowledge acquired by means of learning processes. 
Internal competence reflects, in part, the pervasiveness of a company's ability to adopt and 
effectively use nanotechnology. Thus, to the extent that NanoPct reflects such internal 
competence, we hypothesize a negative relationship between it and university faculty, university 
equipment, and labor resources. To the extent that such experience also dampens a company's 
need for early-stage capital, we hypothesize that the estimated coefficient on NanoPct in the 
early-stage capital to be negative. 
A scale variable is also held constant in alternative specifications of Eq. (1).19 Size represents 
the size of the company, and it is measured alternatively as the number of employees (Emp) or 
total revenue (Rev) in year 2004.20 We offer no hypothesis about the impact of size on the 
existence of diffusion barriers. 
Data on the four independent variables came from the company survey. Observations on some 
independent variables, such as Emp and Rev, are missing which reduces the sample size from 25 
to 19. Descriptive statistics (n=19) on all of the variables relevant to the estimation of Eq. (1) are 
in Table II. And, the distribution of responses to the survey questions for the barriers to growth 
variables are in Table III. 
Table III Discrete response profiles of the barriers to growth variables. 
Variable    Distribution of responses 
Access to:    −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Faculty (%)    0 5.6 16.7 11.1 22.2 22.2 22.2 
Equipment (%)   0 11.1 0 33.3 22.2 22.2 22.2 
Early-stage capital (%)  0 5.6 5.6 16.7 16.7 5.6 50 
More qualified labor force (%) 0 5.6 0 11.1 38.9 22.2 22.2 
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
The ordered probit regression results from question (1) are in Table IV. We did not control for 
response bias to the survey for three related reasons. First, the only data that were available about 
the non-respondents was distance – miles to the nearest university. The mean distance for the 
sample of 19 responding companies was not statistically different from the mean distance for the 
sample of 6 non-responding companies. Second, there was no a priori argument to hypothesize 
why a company would respond or would not respond. And third, Figure 1 shows clearly that all 
but two of the population companies are within 30 miles of a university nanotechnology research 
center. We did test for non-linear effects in Eq. (1) but none were present; we also considered 
Emp and Rev entering logarithmically in Eq. (1), but while the sign pattern on these variables 
was the same as reported in Table IV, the level of significance was lower.21 Finally, Emp and 
Rev are highly co-linear – the correlation coefficient is 0.859 and highly significant – so each 
was considered separately in the estimation. 
Table 4 is omitted from this formatted document. 
Not all of our hypotheses are confirmed, but the results are nevertheless informative. R&D-based 
companies have a greater probability of completely agreeing (see the response scale in Table I) 
that access to university equipment and early-stage capital is a barrier to the diffusion of 
nanotechnology. The case studies of emerging technologies by Link (1996) and Link and Scott 
(1998) demonstrate that even the most experienced R&D companies rarely have sufficient 
equipment or complementary facilities to keep pace with the technology, and rarely are they 
willing to invest in such equipment or facilities until the technology becomes more mature. 
Companies with greater nanotechnology experience have a higher probability of completely 
agreeing that greater access to university faculty is a barrier to the diffusion of nanotechnology, 
perhaps suggesting a minimum efficient level of internal knowledge is needed before accessing 
faculty expertise. If so, this would conform to evidence from previous studies of need and use of 
technical expertise.22 Hall et al.,’s (2003, p. 491) analysis concludes that university faculty are 
included in: 
…research projects that involve what we have called new science. Industrial research 
participants perceive that the university could provide research insight that is anticipatory 
of future research problems and could be an ombudsman anticipating and translating to 
all the complex nature of the research being undertaken. 
Some internal resource base or experience base is thus needed for such university insights to be 
useful. 
The more pervasive nanotechnology is within a company's operations the greater the probability 
of completely disagreeing that a barrier to the diffusion of nanotechnology is greater access to 
university equipment or early-stage capital. The latter finding is almost definitional because a 
company would not be in an early stage of technology development if the technology was 
pervasive. That the need for university equipment is not a barrier to the diffusion of 
nanotechnology in companies in which nanotechnology is more broadly utilized could be 
interpreted to mean that relevant scientific equipment is already in-house otherwise 
nanotechnology would not be so broadly utilized. 
Finally, there is only very weak evidence that, in smaller companies, the probability of 
completely disagreeing that access to early-stage capital is a barrier to the diffusion of 
nanotechnology. And, regardless of the size of the company, access to a qualified labor force is 
not systematically a barrier to the diffusion of nanotechnology. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Although the empirical findings in Table IV represent the only quantitative information about 
barriers to the diffusion of nanotechnology, they must nevertheless be interpreted very 
cautiously. Mitigating the fact that we surveyed the population of nanotechnology companies in 
North Carolina, we have no way to determine if the population of nanotechnology companies in 
North Carolina is representative of the national population.23 And, we lack information about 
the non-responding companies in the population of North Carolina nanotechnology companies 
In fact, what we do not know about each company may be more important than what we do 
know. For example, we do not know if a company is a university spin-off (Libaers et al., 2006). 
If it is, it could view access to university faculty and equipment differently than a company that 
is not (Steffensen et al., 2000). Also, we have no information about how effectively a company 
utilized its existing nanotechnology intellectual property and process technology. A company 
that is more efficient in its use of the extant technology could also view access to university 
faculty and equipment differently especially if the company utilizes university faculty to help it 
overcome technology-based research problems and especially at the basic end of the R&D 
spectrum (Hall et al., 2003). 
With these caveats in mind, we offer two specific recommendations to ameliorate barriers to the 
diffusion of nanotechnology that follow from the findings in Table IV. First, there is a market 
failure in the capital market because of asymmetry of information about the risk and return 
associated with the adoption of nanotechnology and its impact on commercialization. While 
policy makers cannot solve this problem, state governments could act as venture capitalists in 
this regard in much the same way as the SBIR program acts as venture capitalist for agency-
needed technologies. The step would not be unprecedented inasmuch as some states, most 
recently the State of Ohio (2005), have already developed legislation to permit state government 
venture capital funding. Second, states could provide incentives to universities for sharing capital 
equipment and facilities with nanotechnology companies. Such a policy effort would likely raise 
issues as to why nanotechnology and not some other burgeoning technology. One way to counter 
that argument is, say, for states to establish at public universities public/private partnership 
centers of excellence whereby new equipment is provided by the state with an understanding that 
its use is to foster partnerships with the private sector. Such activity would be in line with 
existing state policies in the many centers of excellence programs (Plosila, 2004). 
Additional policy prescriptions await the emergence of more quantitative information about the 
economic impact potential of nanotechnology, in general, and the diffusion of nanotechnology, 
in particular. In the United States, early activities seem to indicate a continuing strong role not 
only for the federal government but also many state governments. 
Notes 
1 The NNI was promulgated in FY 2001 as part of the Clinton administration's efforts to raise 
nanoscale science and technology to the level of a federal initiative. 
2 ‘Encompassing nanoscale science, engineering and technology, nanotechnology involves 
imaging, measuring, modeling, and manipulating matter at this length scale’ 
(http://www.nano.gov/).  
3 The $1 trillion estimate is from the National Science Foundation; the $2 trillion estimate is 
from Lux Research. 
4 Zucker and Darby (forthcoming) provide technology-based information (e.g., patent activity) 
to support indirectly this conjecture. 
5 The section was prepared with the assistance of Craig Boardman (Bozeman and Boardman, 
2004). 
6 PCAST was originally established by President George Bush in 1990 to enable the President to 
receive advice from the private sector and academic community on technology, scientific 
research priorities, and math and science education. The organization follows a tradition of 
Presidential advisory panels on science and technology dating back to Presidents Eisenhower and 
Truman. Since its creation, PCAST has been expanded and currently consists of 23 members 
plus the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy who serves as the Council's 
Co-Chair. The council members, distinguished individuals appointed by the President, are drawn 
from industry, education, and research institutions, and other nongovernmental organizations. 
7 The purpose of the Committee on Technology is to advise and assist the NSTC in improving 
the overall effectiveness and productivity of federal research and development (R&D) efforts. 
The Committee will address significant national policy matters that cut across agency boundaries 
and shall provide a formal mechanism for interagency policy coordination and the development 
of federal technology activities. The Committee will act to improve the coordination of all 
federal efforts in technology. This includes creating balanced and comprehensive R&D 
programs, establishing structures to improve the way the federal government plans and 
coordinates R&D, and advising the Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the 
Director, Office of Management and Budget, on R&D budget crosscuts and priorities. 
8 The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was established by an Executive Order 
on November 23, 1993. This Cabinet-level Council is the principal means for the President of the 
United States to coordinate science, space, and technology to coordinate the diverse parts of the 
federal research and development enterprise. See, 
http://www.ostp.gov/NSTC/html/NSTC_Home.html. 
9 Here, too, the NNI's recognition of nanotechnology's potential importance to the economy is 
clear. 
10 Javanovic (1982) and Javanovic and Rousseau (2005) refer to the latter characteristic as 
‘innovation spawning.’ 
11 David (1990) emphasizes that general purpose technology does not deliver productivity gains 
on arrival, hence our emphasis on expectations over time. 
12 The 40 companies represent those for which the staff of the North Carolina Board of Science 
and Technology had a high degree of certainty regarding whether or not they were using 
nanotechnology. The staff constructed the list by searching the nanotechnology company 
directories of reputable organizations such as Small Times Media and NanoVIP.com; soliciting 
input from academic, corporate, and nonprofit researchers and staff in the state; conducting 
extensive Internet searches using a variety of relevant search terms; and drawing upon their first-
hand knowledge of R&D and commercial activities in the state. 
13 The Board is the state's leading government advisory body on issues related to science- and 
technology-based economic development. Established in 1963 by the state's legislature and 
currently housed in the state's Department of Commerce, its mission is to encourage, promote, 
and support scientific, engineering, and industrial research applications in North Carolina. 
14 This data collection effort by the North Carolina Board of Science and Technology was also 
part of the state's overall Nanotechnology Initiative. See, 
http://www.ncscienceandtechnology.com.  
15 Regarding the two companies that are not within the 30-mile radius shown in Figure 1, 
neither is within 30 miles of a university-based nanotechnology research center nor in another 
state. 
16 Scholars have not yet formally tied the geographic nexus among nanotechnology companies 
and universities to cluster theory, but we believe that is only a matter of time because the pattern 
in Figure 1 is certainly not atypical. 
17 For an in-depth discussion of technology-related market failure, see Link and Scott (2005) 
and Link (2006). 
18 Data on company R&D expenditures, in total or as a ratio to a measure of size, were not 
available. 
19 Size also allows for an indirect test of Gilbrat's Law. Gilbrat's Law states that the size of a 
company and its growth rate are independent, although the empirical evidence is mixed (Sutton, 
1997). We hypothesize that it follows that the size of a company and its need for resources that 
generate growth are also independent. 
20 When either employment (1000s) or revenues ($M) were reported on the survey as a range of 
values, the mid-point of the range was used. 
21 These results are available upon request from the authors. 
22 See Bozeman (2000) for a review of this literature. 
23 In fact, there is uncertainly about the present size of the national population of US 
nanotechnology companies. One estimate places the total at 391. See, www.nanotech-
now.com/business.htm. Another estimate is 860. See, 
www.nanovip.com/directory/International/index.php. Lux Research estimates the US population 
of nanotechnology companies at 1100. These differences are, in all likelihood, due to differences 
in the definition of nanotechnology. 
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